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Synopsis 
This article is a personal reflection on a career that combined much practical business ot business work with 
academic positions. The author reflects on which experiences have been most valuable and where the 
experiences were most closely related to what academics in different fields have written. 
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Introduction 
As I near the end of my career, in which I have worked alternately or simultaneously as a manager, 
consultant and academic researcher and teacher, I have been reflecting on the relationship between 
academic writing and practitioner experience in the business worlds where I have worked. As much of my 
work has been in database marketing, customer relationship management (CRM), and more recently digital 
marketing, it is about these areas that is where I started reflecting on my career and on the relationship 
between academic research and practitioners work (Stone 2012, 2013). However, most of my career, and 
particularly those parts of it where I was a manager, has been in business to business (B2B) marketing, so 
this article summarises my reflections on the relationship between academic literature and practice there. It 
is a personal reflection, connecting my own experiences with the literature. 
Beginning as an economist 
At the beginning of my career, in the early 1970s, I was an industrial economist. My doctoral research was on 
the product policy of industrial firms, at the University of Sussex. I was fortunate to have as supervisor 
Professor Tibor Barna, who was a member of the UK Monopolies Commission, as it was then known. He 
opened up his contacts for me to interview. The Commission had recently investigated the motor industry, 
the packaging industry and the office equipment industries, so I included these in my research. In those days, 
a good qualitatively-researched doctorate was not bound by today’s strange rules of random sampling. If 
you had something significant to research, you just has to show that your findings derived from some 
important industries. I published my thesis, in which I studied various economic theories of innovation to 
determine whether they applied to new product policy, as a book (Stone 1975). 
 
As an economist, the concept of derived demand – demand for a product or service which depends on 
demand further down the supply chain – was familiar to me. It was defined by Alfred Marshall (1890 Ch 6). 
So the idea of a product dominant logic was nonsense even then. Industrial marketers (as they were then 
called) would not have survived two minutes if they believed they were just marketing products. They were 
marketing goods and services which were used to do things”, whether in customers’ factories, on the road or 
with customers’ own customers. In this area, some marketing academics took nearly forty years to catch up, 
as the business to business marketing and regulatory literature was full of examples of service dominant 
logic by the time Vargo and Lusch (2004) published their article. Vargo and Lusch asserted as the beginning 
of their article that marketing 
‘inherited a model of exchange from economics, which had a dominant logic based on the exchange of 
“goods,” which usually are manufactured output. The dominant logic focused on tangible resources, 
embedded value, and transactions’. 
 
This was simply false. It was only later that I learned that academic marketing experts often made their 
reputations by accusing past generations of neglect while renaming an idea that is perfectly familiar to 
practitioners (and indeed previous generations of academics, but perhaps not ones they knew) and claiming 
it as a massive innovation. Similarly, product life cycle theory was taken from an economics domain where it 
had a clear pedigree (Vernon 1966 - used for explaining international trade patterns) and, perhaps using 
findings from sociology and economics (Rogers 1962, Schumpeter 1911), simplified it into an irrefutable 
theory (cycles could always be avoided by managerial action) that was virtually useless other than bringing 
home to marketing managers that what went up could (but might not) come down and might (but not 
necessarily) have certain patterns of profit over time. Much more valuable was the work on technological 
innovation of economists like Mansfield (1968) and the work of Chris Freeman (1974) of the Science Policy 
Research Unit at the University of Sussex, which I came across as a graduate student. 
Marketing and pricing for outcomes and benefits, not product features 
Even the regulators knew about value in use. The Monopolies Commission (HMSO 1956) investigated 
commercial tyres and found evidence of price fixing. How were prices fixed? In money per mile, not money 
per tyre! The service was how many miles a tyre could be safely driven. The same was true in all the other 
industries I examined. Commercial vehicle design was based upon loads that could be carried (strongly 
influenced not just by the physics of loads but also by regulation). Photocopier pricing was in pence per copy. 
Packaging equipment was priced or price benchmarked in terms of millions of cans or packages that could be 
produced (per hour and over the lifetime of the equipment). Of course, the same was true in most of the 
consumer markets that I investigated (e.g. chocolate, grocery food), although the service-dominant logic was 
often hidden behind a language of benefits. Further, the importance of information on competitive pricing 
and benefits was well understood, and the quality of information companies had on these topics, derived 
from reviewing competitive quotes, from trade fairs and from market research, was good. 
First industrial experience 
A lecturing post in the Department of Management Sciences at the University of Manchester Institute of 
Science and Technology shifted my interest away from economics towards marketing, although later I tried 
to bridge the two (Stone 1980). In the late 1970s, I worked as a product manager in the machine tool 
industry in Israel, for a company called Iscar. It made machining tips, which are used in lathes and mills to cut 
and shape metal objects. I had to learn engineering Hebrew! I learned very quickly that although the tips 
were priced in US cents, the most critical factor in their performance was how many machining operations 
they could complete, whether they could do so without requiring machining to stop, and how low the risk 
was of the tip shattering during machining. 
 
Also critical was inventory management. Large automotive companies bought certain tips in their thousands, 
for use in parting tools, used to cut up and groove long steel rods to be used as engine pistons. The Iscar 
design was much better than that of its main competitors, Sandvik’s Coromant, GE’s Carboloy and Krupp 
Widea amongst others. At the time their parting tool design required the tip to be clamped in. Eventually the 
clamp’s grip on the tip would weaken, usually before the tip wore out, and the tip would break loose, 
requiring machining to be stopped while the tip was replaced. Iscar’s patented design allowed the tip to be 
pushed into the parting tool by the machining pressure. This required extremely precise machining of the 
part of the tool which held the tip and of the tip itself. In fact, the tip, being made of tungsten carbide, 
sometime coated with titanium carbo-nitride (which was even harder), had to be diamond-ground. 
 
The net result was a product (tip and tool) which could be made much more quickly and cheaply. More 
importantly, it could be used for much longer without interrupting the machining. Before I arrived, pricing 
had been cost plus, but the problem with that was that customers wanted so much of it that supply kept 
running out. There was no incentive for Iscar to make more of it as it made the same profit margin on all 
products. I had to go above the marketing director’s head to argue for a doubling of the product’s price to 
reflect value in use, better inventory building and deleting a range of me-too products rarely required by 
customers and which we were happy to leave to competitors. The move to value in use turned the company 
from break-even into very profitable. What literature helped me with this? The truth is that the very basics 
of marketing and economics literature focused on perceived value. Later, the principles I had used were 
articulated by the brilliant John Winkler (1983). I wish I had known about his work earlier. 
Business models 
In the early 1980s, I worked in competitive intelligence. My employer was Xerox. My work involved analysing 
Japanese product design, manufacturing and marketing strategies, including analysis of how the (then) 
successful Japanese companies rode and even created waves of technological innovation in product and 
manufacturing technologies. I wrote up my experiences in an article for Long Range Planning, called 
"Competing with Japan: the Rules of the Game" (Stone 1984). I concluded that the Japanese success was due 
to a different way of conceiving competition in business, a different culture and set of capabilities, a 
different model, if you like. Work on business models has progressed significantly since then, though until 
the many revolutions caused by the Web, was largely confined to the strategic planning rather than the 
marketing literature (for example, Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart 2010). Until recently few marketers were 
familiar with the idea of business models, perhaps assuming that the way competition worked in any given 
industry was one of the dependable fixtures of their work. I did my best to articulate the implications of a 
change in business model towards the direction of customer relationship management (Stone et al 1996) 
and also the impact of moving to a disintermediated from an intermediated model (Stone et al 1997) 
First experience of competitive intelligence 
The Japanese approach included how they attacked competitors via distributors. They used ideas based on 
the work of the British engineer Lanchester (1868-1948), on the power relationship between opposing 
military forces, originally applied to aerial combat in WW1 (Lanchester 1916). It is the same Lanchester who 
designed cars. The Japanese consultant Nobuo Taoka set up a marketing consultancy, Lanchester Systems 
and wrote books on marketing strategy (Taoka 1972 and 1982). He educated Japanese businesses as to the 
value of military theory, partly by establishing Lanchester Clubs, in which they discussed how to attack 
Western markets and firms, in the two leading Japanese industrial centres, Tokyo and Osaka. 
 
Lanchester’s central principle was concentration of forces, translated by Taoka into a very focused approach 
to market penetration, one segment after another, usually starting with the Western companies' weakest 
point, which was often at the "bottom of the market", as demonstrated in the famous Japanese motorcycle 
industry case. In attacking Xerox’s market, Canon, the leading Japanese photocopied manufacturer, applied 
this (in the UK) to focusing on Scotland and then the West on England, areas where it knew Xerox to be 
weak, and globally focusing on small copiers and using dealers (not Xerox's channel), focused on small 
businesses (not Xerox’s target). In fact, Xerox's market research sampling frame then did not include 
businesses with less than 10 employees, while its smaller copiers were not competitive with Canon's and 
were less reliable as they were designed to be serviced by skilled engineers rather than the simple module 
replacement approach of Canon, highly suited to a dealer service force and to inexpert users. 
 
Lanchester was not the first to articulate such principles. Sun Tzu’s Art of War (Giles 2005) had more than 
two thousand years before in China described many of the same principles, including the importance of 
planning and intelligence, of concentrating attacks, of exploiting enemy weaknesses and of being flexible 
when circumstances changed. Machiavelli (2005) in his Art of War, published in 1521, drew on his earlier 
political writings to extracts some principles of success relating to discipline and planning, and was often 
cited by later generals, partly because he was thought to articulate well the practices followed by the 
Romans. But perhaps the most famous military thinker to which management writers refer is Carl von 
Clausewitz, whose unfinished work On War, which first appeared in 1832, is famous for its focus on 
intelligence and simultaneous doubt of the accuracy and hence value of tactical, operational intelligence in 
the “fog of war, while stressing the need for top quality strategic and political intelligence. His work is 
controversial for its focus on military genius, as today we would argue that commanders who consider 
themselves geniuses because of their ability to appraise a situation quickly and make rapid decisions are the 
very opposite of geniuses and may destroy their armies or even their own nations. 
Applying competitive principles 
My learning was that competitive intelligence by itself is not enough. As an attacker or a defender, you need 
to focus it, though you must also continue horizon scanning activities to identify unexpected threats and 
opportunities. I also learned the power of senior management denial. The work of Xerox UK’s Department of 
Competitive Information and Strategy, of which I was just a junior member, was dismissed by Xerox US 
senior management. This was despite evidence not just of intentions but also the demonstrable facts of 
import volumes and market penetration. This is the same denial seen at Tesco in 2011 under the leadership 
of the almost deified Terry Leahy and the board of Tesco in the face of strong evidence of competition not 
just from Aldi and Lidl (who are very successful but in terms of their market share small in each country in 
which they operate due to their narrow product ranges) but from Waitrose and a variety of other retailers, 
and by the boards of scheduled airlines in the face of competition by low-cost airlines. An interesting 
character of leaders in denial, also exhibited by Leahy, is their accusation of failure of subsequent leaders, 
even though the responsibility for the failure lies squarely with them – in the case of Tesco through Leahy’s 
adventures abroad and over expansion in the UK. 
Common faults of managers in competitive strategy and intelligence 
In rejecting the content of good intelligence, senior managers are merely repeating the faults of military 
leaders, as identified by Dixon in his work on the psychology of military incompetence (Dixon 1976). Dixon 
defines incompetence as chronic inability to do a particular job or activity successfully. Incompetence may be 
due to a lack of adequate training, skill, aptitude or experience. The characteristics of military incompetence 
identified by Dixon that are most relevant to this article are: 
 Fundamental conservatism, clinging to outworn tradition and inability to profit from past experience 
(perhaps associated with clinging to familiar models) and a love of regularity and regimentation (for 
which read structured planning processes) 
 Rejection, suppression or ignoring information that is unpalatable or conflicts with pre-conceptions, 
particularly news of setbacks – a familiar symptom of this is hockey-stick planning, in which the recovery 
is always over the horizon 
 Over-estimating one’s own side and/or under-estimating the enemy, particularly if they are using a model 
you do not recognise 
 Seeking scapegoats (marketing blaming manufacturing or research and development, or vice versa) 
 Abdication of leadership and/or indecisiveness, often cause by uncertainty as to what is happening 
 Lack of intellectual ability, often in the form of inability to comprehend the impact of a competitive 
challenge based on a new model 
 Crushing individual thoughts, devaluing initiatives, and too much respect for hierarchy, including hostility 
towards juniors who initiate positive achievements without permission 
 
Note that most of the above can apply to individuals or be characteristics of a corporate culture. 
The battle for customers 
In the world of B2B marketing and selling, the battle takes place not just between competitive products and 
services, but also between competitive sales forces, distributors and service forces, and also between 
competitive researchers and technical developers. In other words, competitive success depends very much 
on your people as well as your strategy, and whether they trust you to lead them to success. 
 
But where does the customer fit in all this? One of the problems with applying ideas from military strategy is 
that the customer was often seen as being “conquered”, won from the competitive enemy and then ruled in 
some way. Today, this view seems old fashioned. It never was appropriate, except for pure monopolies. The 
customer is another force, one that may be closely allied with the supplier, neutral or antagonistic to the 
supplier. The building of trust and a strong relationship with the customer is a critical part of competitive 
marketing. A supplier is usually doing it under competitive conditions, when other companies are themselves 
trying to build trust and relationships with customers and (perhaps) even trying to destroy the original 
supplier’s relationship. A supplier’s group of customers is a critical part of its competitive advantage (Bindroo 
et al2 012), indeed its ecosystem (Moore 1996) 
Marketing of IT and telecommunications 
After I left Xerox in 1983, I began a period of marketing consulting. I focused first on marketing and customer 
service in the information technology industry, where the first personal computers were causing mayhem 
among computer marketers because their skills in managing corporate clients did not fit too well with the 
world of dealers and distributors. Here the seminal work was being done by El Ansary and Stern (1977), and 
it was to their work that I turned to understand how marketers saw third party distribution. Apart from this, 
there was not then much useful literature on high technology marketing, so I tried to articulate the 
requirements for success (Stone & Macarthur 1984, Stone 1985). 
Moving to direct marketing 
When companies outside traditional direct marketing users started to implement customer databases in the 
1980s, my knowledge of computer marketing helped. The late Mike Walbridge, whom I had known at Xerox, 
managed all the below-the-line marketing communications at the recently privatised British Telecom, and 
asked if I could apply my knowledge of computer marketing to using computers in the marketing of 
telecommunications, especially to using large customer databases. This led to twenty years of focus on direct 
marketing and then customer relationship management (CRM), in B2B and B2C. Here, a central issue was 
how information technology could be used to apply the principles of B2B account management, particularly 
key account management, to B2C customers. There was little literature to help. The literature of direct 
marketing at the time focused mainly on consumers. So working with co-authors who were consulting 
colleagues at British Telecom, I made my own contributions to the literature, covering database marketing 
and the management of customers via the telephone (Shaw and Stone 1990, Stone et al 1990). 
Business solutions 
My time in consulting led to a research partnership with IBM, and eventually this changed into employment 
for a few years, in the early part of this century, during which I produced two books with my closest 
colleague, Bryan Foss (Stone and Foss 2001, Foss and Stone 2002), each composed of chapters by experts 
from IBM and other companies. The books covered both B2B and B2C, with some chapters specific to B2b. In 
some ways, these books showed that most issues were common to B2B and B2C, with the difference mainly 
due to the depth and breadth of the relationship. Many B2B relationships were becoming increasingly 
transactional under the influence of the web, while many B2C relationships were becoming deeper and 
broader without the added costs that would have been normal before the days of email and the web. 
 
One area that I focused on was B2B outsourcing, where a supplier such as IBM took on management of 
activities further down the value chain. My close colleague Mark Cerasale, now with SAP, proposed that we 
wrote a book about this area, and so we did (Cerasale and Stone 2004), him drawing on his experience of 
working with IBM and me on my consulting experience with many outsourcing companies, not just in IT but 
also in logistics, where I had worked on the outsourcing of parts inventory management for DHL. 
Today’s B2B marketing 
Many things have changed in B2B marketing since my early days, including 
 An explosion in volume and variety of information available, due to the Web, and therefore a much 
greater awareness by all players of what is happening in the market, and in particular how ecosystems 
that support particular markets or suppliers are developing, but with the corresponding risk of 
information overload and inappropriate selectivity in information digested 
 The ability of customers to find their way quickly and precisely to better products and services, using the 
Web, so that a new product or service can emerge almost without warning and succeed globally and 
quickly – this is helped by the emergence of web-based global B2B exchanges 
 The ability of companies to target very precisely the customers they want to attract (and win from their 
competitors), using a combination of digital and database techniques 
 A massive change in the way that customer service is handled, from having very large numbers of front 
line (service engineers, contact centre) staff - a world documented in Stone and Wild 1985 Stone and 
Young (1992), to where as much as possible of service is carried out remotely 
 The growth of content marketing as a critical discipline, with a strong focus on ensuring that customers 
can find the right content, in a world drowning in content that is easily generated and posted 
 Increased complexity, sophistication and professionalism of BB marketers, who now combine the best of 
off- and on-line techniques, but with corresponding skill shortages as digital techniques evolve 
 Much greater sophistication of B2B buyers 
 A much greater awareness of the existence and importance of the ecosystem that includes participants 
from all stages of the value chain (for a description of the digital marketing ecosystem, see Stone 2014) 
Building defences 
These do not all apply equally in all markets, but they do apply in virtually all B2B markets, and particularly 
those subject to rapid technological change. In these circumstances, competitive attacks designed to win 
away one's best customers can be expected. So most companies that operate in these markets have general 
defences, their customer retention programmes. These programmes are designed to reinforce customer 
loyalty, often through incentives or service benefits, and to ensure that a customer that has been 
approached by a competitor knows where to go to solicit a better offer from the incumbent company if the 
competitor's proposition proves very attractive. 
 
The latter can be expensive. When such an approach is deployed, the retained customer's profitability to the 
supplier is normally lower, unless the incentive to stay is low cost e.g. involving use of spare capacity. In such 
cases, proactive retention work can be undertaken, involving communicating better with customers deemed 
most likely to be at risk. This too can be expensive, particularly if false positives are targeted (i.e. customers 
deemed likely to leave actually have no intention of doing so). However, if it works well, it can be very 
profitable. One reason for this is that the reasons for switching are generally known and customers 
experiencing these reasons can be identified before they switch. 
 
Retention is more difficult if vulnerable customers are subject to a focused attack, or offered a much 
superior product or proposition, e.g. service package, better product. A competitor has many choices as to 
which customers to try to win. The question is whether a company should develop generalised defences to 
retain their customers, or try, using competitive intelligence ideas, to identify customers that would be 
targeted by competitors. It is possible to identify specific threats in advance, using competitive analysis of 
(for example), the reasons for customers leaving and their antecedents, analysis of posts and on social media 
by customers suffering from typical churn-inducing problems, blogs by commentators, analyst reports and 
comments, analysis of past practices - focusing particularly on issues of culture and capabilities, and 
presentations and other public statements by competitors’ suppliers (e.g. marketing services).  
Implications 
With this and similar information, a company might be clever enough to bluff about what it is doing, hoping 
to mislead its competitor(s) as to where they should place their defences. This trap can only be avoided by 
defenders who consciously search for attempts at deception. Success here is only likely with companies with 
a very open-minded approach to information search and interpretation, avoiding conventional wisdom. They 
also need a strong framework of data gathering and analysis, covering the kinds of data described above, 
which allows them to identify early signs of a challenge, for example, and separate them from any other 
trends or developments for individual customers, segments or markets. 
Conclusions 
In my career as a B2B marketer, I have found support from the concepts of great marketers, but also from 
theorists and practitioners in different disciplines, from my home discipline of economics to warfare. I have 
been blessed by having a particular blend of academia and experience, almost entirely by chance. This blend 
only occurred because people kept asking me – how about trying X? And I always said yes to X, moving 
happily from academia to industry and back again. It did not make for a very smooth career, but it was full of 
the excitement of either applying academic ideas to industrial situations, or applying my own ideas, only to 
find that I was doing something recommended long ago by one of the great theorists. 
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